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VIKTOR ORBÁN IN VERNACULAR CULTURE1
Conceptualizing politicians as stars is not a new phenomenon; indeed, in ad-
dition to everyday language use, this can also be found in the scholarly literature. 
Perhaps the first sign of this – within democratic political systems – would be the 
cult of Winston Churchill and serial expressions of mass hysteria that followed the 
death of John F. Kennedy, which seemed to be repeated on a global scale in 1997 
with the tragic death of Princess Diana. Scholarly studies on the latter were pub-
lished in rapid succession.2 The cult of personality that arose in various dictatorial 
regimes could be pointed to as the forerunner of all of this, which are expressions 
of the emergence of a cult rooted in the political realm, but in recent times certain 
studies have explored the folk expressions of these cults when a phenomenon 
forced from above becomes an internalized conviction of the individual.3
It is a commonplace that contemporary reality is thoroughly politicized. Politi-
cal points of view prevail in almost all areas of culture, education, and the econo-
my. As a rule, the outcome of this situation is that the political figures presented 
in the mass media become part of our contemporary popular culture and appear 
within the framework of “postmodern folklore” and its various forms (prose, po-
etry, jokes, rhymes, graphic art, paintings etc.) as well as in the area of morality. 
In parallel, popular culture has gained gradually more ground in politics as well. 
As a result, in politics, in the case of leading political figures, known attributes 
of stars in popular culture have also emerged. Contemporary political style is 
increasingly dominated by tabloidization and personalization. This includes a 
focus on the leader,4 which is characterised not only by the fact that political mes-
sages shift rather from organisations to individuals, but also by popularization, 
that is the representation of political events through the lives of ordinary people. 
This is all primarily realised through leading figures in politics. It is impossible 
to capture an entire party in the viewfinder of a camera. It is, however, possible 
to create an image when only one person is speaking and acting, the leader who 
represents the institution through his person. The personalization of politics in-
creases the role of non-rational elements, such as the faith and trust invested in 
the charismatic power of the leader. A political leader may increase his or her 
acceptance through his or her personal power of attraction, image, and actions. 
When presidents and prime ministers are elected, their main role in this is not 
their political position, but rather their personal power of attraction and image 
1 The research was supported by the OTKA NK81502 project, the MTA Bolyai Ösztöndíj project. 
and the MTA-SZTE Research Group for the Study of Religious Culture. 
2 Walter 1999; Bowman 1999, 2001; Blackman and Walkerdine 2001; Daxelmüller 2003.
3 Belaj 2008; de Jonge 2008; Gabanyi 2000.
4 The term leader is used here to refer to a political leader, and it is void of any other implications.
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and their ability to win loyalty among voters and to gain support and mobilize 
their followers. The trust of the believers is grounded in the leader’s personal 
image, characteristics, and power of attraction – and therefore they evoke subjec-
tive emotions that cannot be explained through rational arguments. Personality 
becomes more important than political programme (or interests).5 All these oper-
ate in tandem with tabloidization6 and operate with the help of and through the 
mass media. The moral function of the media – primarily television – can perhaps 
best be observed in the case of star politicians as it is the message of politics that is 
most closely related to the worldview of the common people, their understanding 
of the world, value systems, and course of life. This medialization, however, also 
results in the need for politicians to develop internal and external value systems 
about themselves that satisfy the values of the consumers of mass media most 
thoroughly. As Kéri put it:
“It is not enough to be news, one must appear that way as well.… It is 
not enough to be attractive, interesting and worthy of news on one’s own, 
it is not enough to bring in surprises again and again through newer and 
newer ideas, but one must also be able to represent symbolically the most 
important values of the particular political party through a colourful pres-
entation. Personalization thus is not only representation, but also symboli-
sation. Thus, a political performance is not simply performance worthy of 
the media, but is also an amateur production that should also stand as its 
own refutation. One cannot simply be an excellent actor as there are profes-
sional actors for that; a politician cannot play a role as he is expected to be 
honest. A role cannot be a role because he must truly believe in the truth of 
what he is saying. Indeed, if he does not believe it, then he cannot expect his 
believers to do so.”7 
From the beginning of this process, the political leader is no longer only a poli-
tician, but a media personality who is continually in the centre of the news; he is 
at the centre of public attention and becomes famous, and after a while a group of 
sympathizers from his party become distinguished as his followers, his believers. 
He has become a star but has also remained a politician.
In this regard, we must not forget about the phenomenon according to which 
contemporary political culture is structured more and more on the basis of ar-
chaic patterns. The message of politicians and political parties begins to resem-
ble a religious worldview in part (1) because (a) it reflects a sort of thinking in 
totalitarian terms and (b) voting for a particular party implies the promise of a 
kind of earthly paradise and in part (2) because it reflects a way of thinking in 
binary oppositions. It uses only good or bad characters in absolute terms; thus, 
the good character provides a pattern to be followed by his followers, who can 
5 Körösényi 2003: 14.
6 Cf. Kiss 2003.
7 Kéri 2005: 88.
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imagine themselves in the struggles of that figure. Their struggle is therefore no 
longer symbolic; it becomes a real duel. Each election campaign represents such 
a duel by now, when the prime ministerial candidates from the parties with the 
best chances fight against each other and are reduced to absolutely good or evil 
figures based on binary oppositions. After their struggle, pollsters hurriedly ex-
amine which one was more effective and which one was more able to convince the 
people of his own truth, ideas, and worldview. 
In addition to symbolic struggles, politics by scandal have become the simplest 
and at the same time the most effective tool to illustrate the differences between 
political camps. According to Kéri, “In most cases, political scandals can most 
easily be traced back to some basic moral testimony. Therefore, the champions of 
heroic struggles and media triumphs can represent themselves in rather simple 
terms as representatives of values that have or may have outstanding significance 
in what is called identity politics. If a particular politician is lucky, he may more 
often come across as the angel and not the devil in relation to his or her opponent. 
…[T]he leader and the message that is embodied by him every minute, which 
is spectacularly reduced to black and white truths, become the most important 
political message.”8 (In fact, the opponent’s followers make their judgement the 
same way, except, from their perspective, their own leader is qualified as good 
and the other as bad.) Here we see not only politicians as sources of information 
and news, but also a kind of political circus; that is, emotional responses of em-
pathy are activated that are similar to those at sporting events. This competition, 
however, is not merely a sporting event. It is the clash of worldviews and moral 
world orders; that is, a newer function comes into play.
Viktor Orbán 
Before I demonstrate the impact of star politicians on the folk culture of the 
postmodern age, I would note that I have chosen Viktor Orbán not because I sup-
port or oppose, follow or reject his personality, views, and actions, but because 
I find his figure well-suited to demonstrate my points.9 This may be concluded 
based on his political career since 1989, his constant presence in the news, his 
(symbolic) role in the eyes of his followers, the opinion his followers have of him, 
and his personality so inspirational in numerous areas of popular culture. The 
fact that Orbán’s personality is ambivalent, that is, he is significantly rejected by 
the voters’ camps among rival parties, while his acceptance reaches a similar scale 
among the voters of his own (party), does not constitute a rebuttal of my train 
of thought, but the exact opposite. The way researchers of civil religiosity have 
stated, the social view of civil religion is far from homogeneous, but this does not 
mean it does not exist. Similarly, we judge our historical heroes in different ways. 
8 Kéri 2005: 89.
9 Viktor Orbán has been the prime minister of Hungary from 1998 to 2002 and again from 2010 
to the present. 
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Many, for example, reject the figures of Lajos Kossuth or Imre Nagy, while others 
blindly join the ranks of their followers. This is how it is nowadays in connection 
with contemporary political figures. Viktor Orbán sharply divides public opinion, 
but it should also be noted that since the regime change he is the only Hungarian 
political leader who has continually maintained the support of a significant por-
tion of society and his figure, due to effective media efforts, has been (neo)folklor-
ized and has continuously been maintained within the folklore of the postmodern 
age. This role has resulted from the interplay of various factors.
One, his emergence in the public eye started in a situation that automatical-
ly predestined him to fill a significant symbolic function. In 1989, Hungary was 
characterised by a revolutionary climate. Orbán appeared in this situation in a po-
litically sacred situation as the central figure of the rite connected to the reburial 
of Imre Nagy and his fellow martyrs on 16 June 1989. His speech that since then 
has become one of the symbolic acts of the political regime change in that po-
litical environment – according to historians dealing with the topic – pushed the 
boundaries of recklessness. A young man came almost out of complete obscurity 
and suddenly stood in the centre of a sacred event; he determined its atmosphere 
and with that to some extent also the course of political events to come. It was not 
merely a political event, but a rite with cultic significance, where national heroes, 
whom it was not allowed for us to remember, were buried with dignity.
These repressed emotions were set free by the reburial, and these emotions – 
for the millions following it through the media – were at the same time also re-
interpreted in Orbán’s speech. In that situation, that speech completed the ca-
tharsis, for which the majority of the society had been longing. He appeared in a 
seemingly prophetic situation, not as a politician, but as a preacher of sorts who 
constructs the new framework of interpretation of the way the past may connect 
to the present as well as outlining the possible salvific versions the future may 
hold for the present. It is worth re-examining certain segments of his speech from 
the perspective of reconstructing cultural memory.
“Since the beginning of the Russian occupation and the introduction of 
the communist dictatorship forty years ago, the Hungarian nation has only 
had one opportunity, has had sufficient courage and strength only once to 
make an attempt to achieve its goals set as early as 1848: these are national 
independence and political freedom. Our aims have not changed to date. We 
won’t give an inch on ‘48 and thus we won’t give an inch on ‘56 either. …
These are the statesmen for us, those who even in the shadow of the gal-
lows refused to stand in the same line as the murderers who decimated the 
society and those who refused, even at the cost of their lives, to deny the na-
tion, which had accepted them and had put its trust in them. …
We believe that we should not be grateful that we are permitted to oper-
ate political organisations today. …
If we believe in our strength, we can put an end to communist dictator-
ship. If we are committed enough, we can force the ruling party to submit 
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to free elections. If we keep our eyes on the ideas of ‘56, we can choose a gov-
ernment for ourselves that starts immediate negotiations that begins with 
the immediate withdrawal of Russian troops. If we have enough boldness to 
want all this, then and only then can we fulfil the will of our revolution. No 
one can believe that a one-party state could change on its own.”10
As can be seen from these excerpts, his speech was constructed on the tem-
poral continuum of past-present-future, that is embracing all three dimensions 
of temporal existence in such a way that cultural memory could operate. As Ass-
mann has also emphasised, memory not only reconstructs the past, but also or-
ganises the experience of the present and the future.11 
His first appearance resulted in quite extreme emotions in his audience. All 
of a sudden, he had some followers, while many rejected his new bold and revo-
lutionary tone. These were also manifestations of generational differences since 
youthful fervour was not viewed as a considered and wise choice by a population 
that had lived through relative peace and quiet, which had been suffused with 
the authority of the party under the Kádár regime, while young people lined up 
behind him based on their conviction that a lot of tiny jumps would not get them 
over to the other side. 
His political career and legitimacy tie him to Imre Nagy on the one hand but 
his relation to him is quite ambivalent. On the one hand, he could not follow Nagy 
since he had been a communist politician,12 but at the same time he bowed his 
head before him in connection with the events of the revolution and his conduct 
during his false punishment. In this respect, it is interesting that the fervour of 
1989 that was most characteristic of Sándor Petőfi and Lajos Kossuth was replaced 
by the political (ideological) orientation related to István Széchenyi,13 embracing 
the principle of considered measures, after Orbán became the head of govern-
ment in 1998, which he also maintained during his second term as of 2010. Besides 
age-related changes in his own life, another important reason for this might have 
been that Széchenyi’s political views and thus reforms to be achieved through 
considered political engagement, that is, based on the economic development of 
the country, were more acceptable for broader cross-sections of society than Kos-
suth’s radicalism of 1848.  It was then that significant changes were also intro-
duced in Orbán’s symbolic politics. His return from liberalism to conservatism 
and the emphatic appearance of the value system of Christianity are all elements 
10 http://www.fideszfrakcio.hu/index.php?CikkID=22 Access: 11 November 2008.
11 Assmann 2004: 43.
12 Imre Nagy, the martyred prime minister of the 1956 Hungarian Revolution, considered him-
self a faithful communist until the day he was executed.
13 Sándor Petőfi was a poet of the 1848–‘49 Hungarian Revolution, one of the best-known fig-
ures of Hungarian poetry. He espoused radical liberal political views. Lajos Kossuth was a liberal 
politician, a governor of the country during the Revolution, one of the most well-known Hungarian 
statesmen. Count István Széchenyi has been considered the greatest Hungarian, one of the leading 
politicians of the Age of Reform and Kossuth’s political opponent.
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of this.14 It is neither my task nor my aim to judge Orbán’s political endeavours, 
but it is important to stress that archetypes deeply rooted in folk culture also ap-
peared in the process. Indeed, a kind of compensation can be observed, located 
behind the slogan “Dare to be great”. After the idealized type of person during 
communism, the member of the proletariat made uniform and trained to econo-
mize, he outlined a new attitude which became popular since the little man no 
longer wished to stay little. He wanted to break out of his own insignificance. He 
wanted to perform great deeds, similarly to the way of the youngest hero of folk 
tales that comes from poverty but breaks out and performs great deeds. 
Now, let us examine what sort of phenomena and changes symbolic politics 
have generated in the system and operation of popular culture. First of all, let 
us study the basis for all further impacts and cultic manifestations, the symbolic 
image that evolved around the personality of Orbán. In order for someone to 
become a star, it is necessary to have an organic relationship, a shared social back-
ground between the fans and the star. If it does not exist, the emblematic identi-
fication with the star does not develop and the fans do not feel that they belong 
together. Thus, they cannot project their own desires, and similarly they cannot 
identify with the struggles of the star. As far as the bond exists, all of these can be 
realised and the figure of the star – in this case, Orbán – can become, in a certain 
sense, what they themselves would like to become.
“I really don’t know much about him or about politics as such or what 
exactly they did then or do now, but it’s for sure that Orbán is a nice person. 
He’s down-to-earth and he’s more understandable than Gyurcsány.15 He’s 
not as stuck up as him. But that doesn’t make him a hero or anything like 
that. I just respect him, more than the others. … Actually, I don’t respect 
any other politicians but him.”16
“Viktor is a family-centred man. He’s a lot more human and honest than 
other politicians. He sees people’s lives much better. So it’s like when we’re 
in the same boat. We’re in the same boat, I think. He has five children. In 
that way too, he’s got a big family too.”17
The manifestation of this bond is when Orbán, a member of the larger com-
munity, is identified with the nation and is its sole saviour, having been granted 
14 It is interesting to note that the reduction to binary oppositions appears in relation to ideologi-
cal positionings as well. When I asked the interviewees to tell me in what ways Orbán was different as 
a person from his political opponents, in their opinion, I received the following answers: 
“Medgyessy [socialist prime minister, 2002–2004] is a selfish bloke. He is bloody selfish…. Not like 
Széchenyi or Orbán!”
“Gyula Horn [socialist prime minister, 1994–1998] is a murderous beast! Quite an evil man. A 
good soldier for the system. If I mention ‘56, my blood starts boiling, even if I think about it or say 
the name of Imre Nagy. They are murderers, damn it, nothing more. They have to be fought against; 
there are no two ways about it. Viktor must beat them!” 31-year-old man from Szeged, 6 April 2006.
15 Ferenc Gyurcsány, socialist prime minister, 2004–2009.
16 32-year-old man from Szeged, 14 November 2008.
17 29-year-old women from Szeged, 14 October 2008.
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almost messianic attributes on entering office. Orbán represents the nation as the 
leader. People expect him to solve all problems, even the ones that they them-
selves cannot solve. They expect him to lead them out of recession, create a flour-
ishing economy and culture, and re-establish safety and public morality. Orbán is 
a politician, but these expectations refer to the totality of political life. However, 
if a politician is expected to introduce total changes that impact almost all walks 
of life, this person – in terms of functionality – is manifested as the object of a 
religious attitude.18 This is captured in expressions such as “Take care of us, take 
care of our Homeland,” which compare him to a patron saint and assign similar 
roles to his person. 
“Dear Prime Minister,
 Thank you for your self-sacrificing and highly appreciated work, which 
you have done for us, for the Hungarian People, and for the Country. … 
Only you and your party represent the right path …”
“Dear Prime Minister,
Not a day, not even an hour passes by without me thinking about the 
upcoming elections and the future of the country. With all my respect, I ask 
you to take care of us, to care of our homeland. … I ask God’s good blessing 
on all your work and efforts. Long may you lead the Hungarians!”
“Dear Prime Minister,
I wish you all the success, endurance, and boundless peace for your fu-
ture work in the coming months. Make your dreams, which are also ours, 
come true. …”
“Dear Orbán family,
I wish you happy holidays and many good blessings from God. May you 
have the strength to lead us out of this bleak situation. Go, Hungary, go! 
Go, Hungarians, go!!!!”
“With all the warmth in my heart, I wish you and your lovely family 
peaceful Easter holidays full of spiritual renewal! Please rest because you 
are badly needed by our HOMELAND!”19
“From the ‘sacred mountain’ of the Székely people, the peak of Hargi-
ta in Madaras, I ask that the blessing of the Virgin Mother of Csíksomlyó 
should follow every step you take.”
18 This is what the cult of personality is about.
19 These quotations have been selected at random from the forum section of Orbán’s official 
homepage from 2002 to 2008. Available: http://orbanviktor.hu/vendegkonyv.php Access: 12 Novem-
ber 2008.
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“All better? I’m sure you are because God helps a Man like you to get 
better.”20
The parts in cursive refer to the appearance of national identity and religion/
religiosity. The sense of national belonging and communon with the nation is 
supported by “Take care of our Homeland” and “Go, Hungarians, go”. Religious 
content is expressed by “I ask God’s good blessing” and “peaceful Easter holidays 
full of spiritual renewal”, which are aimed at a person who is able to “take care 
of our homeland” on his own since “only he represents the right path” in order 
“make the dreams of the nation come true” and “lead them out of their bleak situ-
ation”. In connection with the texts, it is worth citing Ernst Cassirer: “We easily 
understand the assumption in savage life that all human powers and all natural 
powers can be condensed and concentrated in an individual man. The sorcerer, 
if he is the right man, if he knows the magic spells, and if he understands how to 
use them at the right time and in the right order, is the master of everything. He 
can avert all evils, he can defeat every enemy; he commands all natural forces. 
… Yet, if modern man no longer believes in a natural magic, he has by no means 
given up the belief in a sort of ‘social magic’. If a collective wish is felt in its whole 
strength and intensity, people can easily be persuaded that it only needs the right 
man to satisfy it.”21
This is of course accompanied by a conscious image-making which attempts 
to meet as much as possible the needs of the masses. This is why we see the ap-
pearance of writings and images in some media, such as Internet sites, stressing 
his connection with the people – which are also created for propaganda reasons 
among other purposes. In this case we are not dealing with the construction of the 
folktale-like life path as seen in the case of other stars. We are not encountering 
the role of the youngest child, of poverty in childhood, of an early appearance of 
talent, of not being understood at an early age, and of resultant forced migration 
since these are not emphasised in the case of a star politician.22 In the case of star 
politicians, what counts is not their own childhood and past (and it is not about 
the dubious political past that has come to light again and again in the case of cer-
tain politicians) but primarily their future, the image of the future that he is able 
to promise to the community through his own person.
“It was different in his day. There was still a future then. Now there’s 
not. There’s nothing now. The young had opportunities then, but what have 
they got now? Nothing. You can leave the country, and then that’s it.”23
20 www.facebook.com/orbanviktor Comments from 2 October 2013. Access: 24 November 2013.
21 Cassirer 1974: 281.
22 Cf. Povedák 2011. 
23 The interview was conducted in 2008, when Orbán was in the opposition. 32-year-old man 
from Szeged, 14 November 2008.
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“I’m sure he would have done it! The situation would be different now. 
He cared about the people. Of course, he was a Christian. Or he still is…. 
Help your neighbour and God will help you.”24
In the event that the development of the vision for the future is received with 
success – for example, elections – in the next step, his present and past come to 
the centre of public attention. This step is already linked to the process of creat-
ing stars. It is a process guided from above, but it is absolutely necessary for the 
community to be receptive and to have a demand for it. This is what comments 
on Orbán’s homepage demonstrate:
“Dear Prime Minister,
We were so moved that for long minutes my wife and I were mulling 
over how we should express our appreciation after we looked at your home-
page on the Internet. We thank you for giving us ordinary citizens a glimpse 
of your life and the details of your work. We would like to encourage you 
with this little rhyme of ours since even you may have hard days: 
When the skies above turn grey, 
Just think back to the day
They’d kick the ball and race 
And the tyre ruts they’d chase: 
Their future, their world, their dream….
So don’t forget that team
Still with you on that day
When the skies above turn grey.”25
We can see community censorship is still in place today, albeit not in a preven-
tive form. However, it follows the publicity created by the media in such a way 
that this kind of censorship determines the extent to which a particular person 
becomes a leading personality in the eyes of the people in the age of the consumer 
society. It is partly because of this communal need that we see images (see Annex) 
in which Orbán converses spiritedly with the common man, the retired and the 
young, about their everyday lives, problems, and joys. The face of Orbán that can 
be seen in these images proves that he is interested in the people and in the fate 
of his nation, and he communes with them. (One of these is the image in which 
Orbán is a tour guide for school groups in Parliament.) What the receiving com-
munity concludes from all this is that the politician, regardless of how great a man 
he has become, is the son of the people. He has not left them, the little people. He 
is a person who aids people in their problems even if it inconveniences him, such 
as in 2001 and then in 2006, when he himself appeared in wellingtons to assist the 
flooded regions and pitched in to stack sandbags to shore up an embankment.26  
24 28-year-old man from Szeged, 22 October 2008.
25 http://orbanviktor.hu/vendegkonyv.php Access: 12 November 2008.
26 http://origo.hu/print/itthon/20060403gumicsizmaban.html Access: 12 November 2008.
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“What I like about Viktor Orbán is that beyond his big family and tough 
governing style, he always enjoys himself, he is a real MAN because you 
can’t pretend to do that.”
“Yes indeed, it is like he is one of us ordinary people. That’s why he is 
such an empathetic soul because he never forgot where he came from!”
“Viktor Orbán is one of us, he just did something very well, and actually 
knowledge is a great power. And he knows how to put that to use!”27
“He’s religious man. I think he gave his help sincerely, and there was no 
politics in that. Why couldn’t he also be helpful? Because he’s a politician? I 
believe in him. Look at him now too. They are the ones helping people. That 
is, they’d like to help people, but they are watching out for them and they 
want to lower taxes. That would be good for us, wouldn’t it? It might be 
bad for the state, but it would be good for us. This is what matters to Orbán 
and his people, while that is what matters to Gyurcsány and his people.”28
This role can be authenticated, not only through personal contacts but also 
through the ordinariness of his present-day life and private sphere. However 
much Orbán has become a national leader and however much he works for the 
country and the people, he also has a private life that he enjoys as much as those 
for whom he works as leader. Reports appear on the news that are not about his 
struggle with his opponents, but about the peaceful daily lives and events that are 
so ordinary that perhaps they do not really represent news value but still play an 
important role.29 This is the news through which we can learn about the value sys-
tem and morality of the politician. We learn that Orbán is also religious since we 
can see images of him appearing in church or blending in the crowd of pilgrims 
without any fuss at the Whitsunday feast in Csíksomlyó. We find out that he likes 
sports, cheering at football matches (and not in the VIP section of the stadium). 
Moreover, he even plays football himself. Besides all this, he is a family-centred, 
responsible father. (We can also read about his family life, his five children, and 
his wife, and we learn that he would like to have twenty grandchildren.) “Yester-
day, it was my turn to tell Flóra a tale, by heart, mind you, because they appreciate 
it a lot more than when you read it. I tried to be entertaining with the story of the 
little pigs and the wolves since her pacifier was just taken away forever ‘by the cat’ 
and my little angel finds that difficult to accept.”30 He likes being natural.
27 Comments from 29 October 2013. Available: www.facebook.com/orbanviktor. Access: 24 No-
vember 2013.
28 28-year-old man from Szeged, 22 October 2008.
29 “It is quite usual that press gives some kind of background information on the family of the 
politician, but if those efforts are regularly fed by the politician, then we should talk about an attempt 
to turn celebrity.” Kiss 2005: 11. 
30 Excerpt from an interview with Viktor Orbán. Story, 7 August 2008, p. 8.
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As a result, he has built a rustic adobe house in the country, not in a showy 
spot, where in his own butcher shop, he has bacon, ham, and sausage hanging. 
“Before we got into it, we looked around the area for days with the architect to 
discover the folk motifs and accommodated to that when we made the house 
out of adobe. I didn’t want to use modern building materials if you can make an 
equally good – an even better – house using traditional techniques.”31 The lifestyle 
choice of returning to nature that is seeing a renaissance nowadays can also ex-
press for readers that through his return to nature, being natural, and village life, 
we also witness his return to the life of the common man, and Orbán no longer 
blends into the crowd in the image of the media, but he does so in the reality 
of his daily life among the residents of Felcsút. He blends among the people as 
if he were a postmodern folk leader in disguise – although he is not actually in 
disguise. He lives his daily life without any media events, fuss, or hint of being 
special, he busies himself in the kitchen. “My fatherly authority is strengthened 
by scrambled eggs, in which I am unbeatable. If we all sit down together at the 
table, I make them with twenty eggs and slide some fatback under it. Cooking at 
our place is actually a family tradition. I was 13 years old when my mother taught 
me the basics…. I also follow my mother’s example, and, when the children reach 
that age, I also have them try their hand at the cooker.”32 These beliefs may be-
come the personal opinions of the readers.
“See, here it is. ‘Viktor Orbán wants 15-20 grandchildren.’ We’re in the 
same boat there too. And he lives in an adobe house, there it is. Something 
else we share!”33
Orbán is an ordinary person, therefore; however, for his followers, he is more 
deeply a leader and saviour to his people. He is a multiple, heterogeneous per-
sonality, the common and great man all in one. His followers expect him to show 
that he knows something that no one else knows and can do something that any-
one could do. The son of the people, who, by becoming the leader of the nation, 
is conceived as a personal hero to everyone who has come from the people, deals 
with the problems of the people and therefore is one of them. One manifestation 
of this is that his first name, Viktor, is widely used as a term of endearment. His 
name is shouted in chorus in a sort of cheer at public gatherings and on tours of 
the country,34 and he is addressed this way in electronic messages, in which at-
tachment to him is also extended to his entire family.
31 Excerpt from an interview with Viktor Orbán. Story, 7 August 2008, p. 6. 
32 Excerpt from an interview with Viktor Orbán. Story, 7 August 2008, p. 7.
33 29-year-old woman from Szeged, 14 October 2008.
34 These evoke the atmosphere of sporting events in the participants since they are expecting the 
appearance of their own man and they are eager for him to succeed. Orbán does not leave them disap-
pointed because “he tells it to them like it is” and the participants leave the rite feeling that they have 
triumphed over the – only symbolically present – opponent.
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“Dear Viktor,
I wish you and your lovely family very happy and blessed Easter holidays!
Yours, with affection and respect,
Mrs KJ”
“Dear Viktor,
…on behalf of my friends and the mayor, please accept my invitation to 
our village day celebration on 13 September 2007, where we could talk some 
at a public forum.
Go, Hungary, go
Go, VIKTOR, go”35
In addition to the media, centrally organised rites, commemorations and 
speeches strengthen Orbán’s influence. His sudden emergence in the world of 
politics was due to just such a rite in 1989, and by now these events – primarily na-
tional holidays – provide a platform for the masses to come to know and then in-
tegrate into their own lives, first, his political convictions and, second, his world-
view. For this it is also necessary to turn these rites from merely political events 
into something of a much broader spectrum, into politicized cultural events. These 
should be “not holy days, but holidays,” where people become excited not about 
ideas and the victorious past, but are simply enjoying themselves.36 The rites that I 
have examined unite both types of days in their characteristics. The mythological 
forms, religious characteristics, and heroic representations are in the foreground 
in terms of his speeches, while entertainment dominates during the performances 
by various singers and dance ensembles. In rites of remembrance, Orbán’s speech 
never breaks out of the flow of the profane entertainment in its sacredness, but he 
departs from the profane present and leads us by baby steps closer through vari-
ous stages of the rite to the sacred peak.37 Examples of these include the celebra-
tion of 23 October, in which it can be observed that the heroes of our day play an 
outstanding role in maintaining and re-interpreting tradition. This also holds true 
for some of the national party events that encourage various age groups in the 
populace to engage in some sort of secular pilgrimage. While the event is about 
commemoration, people participate in it much rather because of someone who is 
an outstanding figure for them and is still alive. Orbán’s personality generates a 
mass movement to a large extent, but he uses his message to lead his fans to the 
past and to outstanding heroes of the past, thus revitalizing and strengthening 
their cult. Therefore, besides guiding public morality, he also plays a significant 
role in re-interpreting traditions. At times like this, he re-evaluates the past in 
relation to the present in such a way that he also outlines the future of the com-
munity. Turns of phrase he uses in his speeches at times of such (political) rites 
35 http://orbanviktor.hu/vendegkonyv.php Access: 12 November 2008.
36 Feischmidt and Brubaker 1999. http://www.c3.hu/scripta/scripta0/replika/honlap/ Access: 18 
November 2008.
37 Ferenc Pataki defines the group of people participating in such events as the “devout masses” 
(áhítatos tömeg). Pataki 1998: 132-136.
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are extremely significant. Besides his representations in the media, these speeches 
strengthen the feeling in the community that Orbán is from among them and 
shares a community with them, a sense which is strengthened in them by his fre-
quently used ways of addressing them, for example “My friends in freedom” and 
“Ladies and gentlemen, dear friends”. 
An important element of my research is the fact that the connection to the he-
roes of the past takes place partly through the representation of our contemporary 
heroes. The stars’ power to shape public opinion is considered when famous peo-
ple living today appear on the stage at an event. These are people who are loved 
by the audience, many of whom are considered national heroes by the public. 
These people are primarily sportsmen38 and musicians and actors, who have be-
come very popular in their own field. The star politician, therefore, attracts other 
stars, he or she uses them and their cult so that their previous achievements, inde-
pendent of politics, justify their political activities.
Viktor Orbán in folklore
Finally, let us examine the inspirational role of Orbán in various genres of folk-
lore. His political career of over two decades is a long enough period to have a long-
lasting effect on popular culture. As a result, his figure appears in various genres of 
(postmodern) folklore. First, I would like to survey various examples of prose tied 
to his person. In line with the process through which folk poetry has changed most 
recently, folk poetry about Orbán does not represent significant aesthetic value, but 
fits into what Vilmos Voigt described as early as 1972: “The anecdotes, rumours, 
erotic, political and other sorts of jokes and so-called true stories, accounts of per-
sonal experiences … and other stories appear as independent genres.”39 This list, 
however, must be supplemented with election period rhymes and text and email 
messages. Accounts of memories connected to some of the more humorous or 
memorable elements of a media appearance of Orbán’s or a speech given by him at 
a public gathering should not be explained at length since it is clear that such stories 
involving politicians are common after every such event. We can look at rumours 
in a similar vein. I must note that a significant portion of rumours about him result 
from the folklorization of news about him in the media, in the spreading of which 
missing information is significant as well as the basic human feature people share of 
enjoying it when they are in possession of information.40 I need to emphasise with 
regard to rumours (slander and libel) that their truth value and information content 
often have a more powerful manipulative role and influence than truth itself. 
38 Members of the legendary Hungarian football team from the 1950s, the Golden Team, who are 
still alive are Gyula Grosics and Jenő Buzánszky. Hungarian Olympic champions include swimmer 
Krisztina Egerszegi and boxer István Kovács.
39 Voigt 1972: 241.
40 It is a well-known observation in social psychology that within groups the person who is in 
possession of the majority of the information, that is, extra knowledge in relation to the other members 
of the group, becomes the central figure. 
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The most recent epic folklore creations, text and email messages, can be a great 
deal more exciting for us than rumours. These can be divided into three catego-
ries. First, there are political scare tactics regarding Orbán acquiring (and retain-
ing) power, jokes, mobilizing campaign messages, and rhymes. The tense politi-
cal situation undoubtedly favours scare tactics. Humour, however, has also been 
able to relieve political tension.41 People send round some of the same jokes that 
they tell each other in person. Various creations are characterised by powerful 
variability. The names in them change frequently. Moreover, they are also char-
acterised by the simplification to the most extreme and sharp oppositions – the 
good and the bad here are absolutely that. In jokes, Orbán – depending on which 
political camp sends it – appears as a positive as well as a negative character. 
“Having checked with experts, László Kovács42 made Viktor Orbán responsible 
for the fall of the Roman Empire.” Some jokes related to religious themes should 
be emphasised in particular: “Viktor Orbán is not just religious. He is religion 
itself!” “Viktor Orbán didn’t go to school to study. He just wanted to check out 
where they would be teaching about him.” “God left the Earth to itself. He knew 
that he would have nothing to do next to Viktor Orbán!”
Texted jokes are characterised by a kind of tightness and formal simplicity be-
cause of the limited character count. We can conclude the same in connection with 
messages related to mobilization. Some of these call attention to a particular event 
at which Orbán also appears, while others are funny rhymes related to elections. 
“All you dopes in Budapest. 
You think Gyula Horn is best,
But the countryside’s agreed
It’s no henchman that we need.
Our victory’s all the sweeter.
We’ve got Orbán as our leader.
Pass it on today.”
“You commies, be afraid. 
Eat the cherry cakes you’ve made.43 
Libero libs, just own up. 
Viktor’s got it sewn up.
Hun-gar-i-ans know where to be: 
KOSSUTH SQUARE, THIS SATURDAY, AT 3!
Pass it on!”
41 We witnessed an incredible increase in the number of political jokes, which was promoted by 
the fact that jokes were used directly in political rivalry as well. Voigt proved to be right then when 
he said that “although the number of political jokes decreased around and after 1989 by now (I won-
der why) they have regained their daily presence” (Voigt 1998: 322). And a further increase can be 
expected in this regard.
42 László Kovács is a leading socialist politician.
43 This is a reference to Péter Medgyessy, the socialist prime minister. The Hungarian word meggy, 
which sounds like the first syllable of his surname, means “(sour) cherry”.
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“VIKTOR ORBÁN WRITES:
WE NEED MORE FOR THE FIGHT.
WHEN NEXT WE HERE THE CALL,
IN LINE WE ALL MUST FALL!
LONG LIVE OUR HOMELAND!
PASS IT ON TO FIVE PATRIOTS.”
These rhymes and political tunes are most similar to the shout-outs in the old 
marketplace and the advertisement copy that developed from them. Although 
they lack any aesthetic excellence, I must note that text messages are folklore crea-
tions in the strictest sense of the word in contrast to mass culture since they are 
both expressions of a community with the power to form a community. With 
regard to their sources, I must note that they often draw on certain works of high 
culture (gesunkenes Kulturgut), earlier works of folklore, or international material. 
However, independent of these, the way they are selected and transformed ex-
presses an independent and contemporary folk culture. The variability of works 
of folklore, however, does not merely represent the exchange of certain personal 
names or changes in certain details; rather, temporal migration and variation ex-
ist as a result. In connection with the elections in 2006, some of the text messages 
from 2002 became topical again, and there was no significant change between 
the two, except that the material collected in connection with the 2002 elections 
is significantly richer than that from four years later.44 Therefore, it is proved yet 
again that the same works can be related to different people. The works therefore 
are passed down in keeping with the rules of folklore.45 Election rhymes belong-
ing to the first group of emails are related to these latter works of mobilization; 
they reflect the political preferences of their creators and transmitters in broader, 
poetic, humorous, and, at times, vulgar forms.
“To the polls I went, 
Where some commies had been sent
To try and defeat ‘em, 
But FIDESZ will beat ‘em.
Pack your bags, there’s the street.
Here comes Viktor, there goes Pete.”
“We love this land, we’re here to stay.
Mark our words, we’ll have our day.
In two weeks’ time, there is no doubt,
We’ll grab the bums and vote them out.
Long live Viktor, down with Pete.
Give him time to beat his meat!”
44 This number decreased further by 2010.
45 In addition to a Viktor-Péter (Pete) name switch from a previous rhyme, also note the appear-
ance of the name of former socialist prime minister Gyula Horn in the 2002 campaign and then that of 
former socialist PM Péter Medgyessy.
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I must note that the trickling down of high culture can be observed here too 
since parodies of longer poems such as Toldi and The Bards of Wales by János 
Arany appear within the framework of email folklore in which the figure of Or-
bán also emerges. This material is therefore no longer a pure folklore phenom-
enon but a unique blend of folklore and official art, public poetry.
Ilona Nagy discovered an anecdote in connection with Orbán in the news daily 
Romániai Magyar Szó: “When he was still only chairman of his party, Viktor Orbán, 
prime minister of Hungary, visited Székelyudvarhely and stayed at the home of 
Molnos the solicitor. In the morning, he saw that the solicitor’s wife was cleaning 
his shoes. Surprised, he asked: ‘What are you doing, Miss Irénke?’ ‘I’m cleaning 
your shoes so that I could one day say: I cleaned the shoes of Hungary’s prime 
minister!’ So then he grabbed Miss Irénke’s shoes and started cleaning them. Then 
Miss Irénke also asked: ‘What are you doing?’ ‘I’m cleaning your shoes so that 
you could say one day: Hungary’s prime minister cleaned my shoes’.”46
I will close this series of prose works with a tale that was borne out of the most 
recent political events and includes the oppositions outlined so far:
“The king with the dancing feet
Once upon a time, nothing even remotely like this ever happened. In a 
land far, far away, where even an ox could become a great lord and where 
short-tailed pigs shoved red carnations47 away with their snouts, there was 
once a king whose name was Feri and he had dancing feet.48 He loved danc-
ing so much that he had spent all his fortune on expensive shoes, but the 
soles of the shoes wore out quickly. His poor people had a bleak future in 
store since a king with dancing feet was ruling their country. When Feri 
danced, he showered abuse on the country. He shouted that the country is 
a whore, which was awfully rude. He told off everyone in the country, the 
young and the old alike, thinking they would not hear it anyway. Our little 
saint was having such a good time. If only he could have kept the country 
in order. He danced away the fortune of his people so in order to keep from 
being butchered, he set up many thousands of lead soldiers in front of his 
palace. The treasury yawned with emptiness, as did his head, which he was 
busy scratching. And lo and behold! One gold coin glistened in the middle 
of the treasury, but it was not enough for him to save his country. In order 
to ease the great chaos, he sent for Viktor, the great wizard. He was his old 
rival, and he would have liked Viktor dead. ‘How can we make a hundred 
gold coins out of one?’ Viktor was the right man to ask. It was difficult to 
outsmart this wizard. He was nobody’s fool. The king called for the wizard 
so that he could save the kingdom. Viktor didn’t want to lose his head be-
cause he liked it to stay on his neck since there was so much knowledge there. 
So Viktor said the magic words very quickly: ‘Dance, Feri, dance! Dance till 
46 Nagy 2006: 428-429.
47 The red carnation is the symbol for the socialists.
48 This is a reference to former socialist prime minister Ferenc Gyurcsány.
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your shoes wear out!’ And so the king danced happily ever after, although 
not so very happily since he could no longer steal from the treasury.
A short tale for adults.
2 March 2009”49
An increasing number of examples can be noted nowadays within Internet 
folklore to confirm the theory of technological determinism. Humorous memes 
dominate in which the person to be ridiculed is a character in a well-known work 
of high or popular culture (e.g. a painting and a film). Accordingly, Orbán ap-
pears on a banknote and a film poster for and excerpt from The Godfather, The 
Matrix, and the Star Wars films. Besides these, to a lesser extent, Orbán’s figure is 
also present in conventional paintings as well. Moreover, his portrait may appear 
cut out of a newspaper or magazine and may be displayed on the wall of a room 
or office or on a t-shirt in a traditional manner.
The profane cult of relics is by far not as significant and varied in association 
with his figure as it is, for example, in connection with stars who are singers. I 
must add that Orbán is a living figure and therefore objects related to him are not 
unique since one can practically meet him at any time. His followers, however, 
consider contact with him a key moment in their lives, as borne out by images 
taken of crowds of people gathered to shake his hand and of an elderly lady who 
is kissing his hand and by an email whose writer was deeply touched because he 
had been able to get a glimpse into Orbán’s life: “We thank you for giving us ordi-
nary citizens a glimpse of your life and the details of your work.” His autograph 
can also be extremely important; indeed, people are willing to wait for hours for 
an autograph with Orbán’s newly published book in their hands.
It can thus be concluded that the cult of star politicians is the closest to that of 
historical heroes. Clearly, the similarities also stem from the fact that the political 
profession means that a politician must serve the interests of the community and 
the nation. It is much easier, therefore, for a charismatic person to emerge from 
this environment and become a hero since personal success is basically possible 
here in a way that blends with the success of the broader community as well. 
Direct ties with the politics of an historical heroic predecessor is also important, 
which the star politician continually reiterates. It was no coincidence that in 1989–
‘90 Orbán referred to his party a number of times as Petőfidesz, that his govern-
ment introduced the Széchenyi Plan, named after the great nineteenth-century 
Hungarian statesman, and that it backed the making of the film A Hídember (The 
Bridgeman) about the same man and his achievements. Besides these, Orbán has 
reached back to other national heroes. In honour of Hungarian football legends, 
he has established the Puskás Ferenc Football Academy to support talented chil-
dren and has also launched the Bozsik Programme.50 
49 The writer of the tale lives in Szeged and spread the tale by photocopy among his acquaint-
ances. This is how I received it on 7 April 2009.
50 The name Petőfidesz contains a reference to the revolutionary poet Sándor Petőfi. József Bozsik 
was on the legendary Golden Team with football legend Ferenc Puskás, “the most famous Hungarian”.
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Nowadays Orbán is clearly a star is his own political camp. At the same time, 
approaches to him link him more to historical heroes. His cult is ever growing. He 
may, of course, be pushed into the background as a result of a political turn that 
is unfavourable to him, but the fact that his cult has not weakened after two lost 
parliamentary elections – indeed, his leading position has been reinforced within 
his camp during this period – suggests otherwise.
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